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Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) have become an increasingly popular way to raise capital for 
blockchain technology startups. In an ICO, entrepreneurs raise money for their venture by 
selling newly created cryptocurrency tokens to investors in exchange for fiat currency such as 
US dollars or cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum or Bitcoin (Chohan, 2017; Kastelein, 2017). 
At the time of the ICO, the project is mostly at the idea stage and the actual launch of the 
product or service is expected within one to two years after the ICO (EY, 2017). The 
cryptocurrency tokens typically act as a digital medium of exchange to access the firm’s 
digital platform and services.  After completing the ICO, the tokens can be traded on an 
online exchange and increase in value with the success of the project. One advantage for 
entrepreneurs is that ICOs allow them to raise capital by selling tokens rather than shares and 
therefore do not require them to give up ownership and control rights to investors as would 
be the case with venture capital or equity-based crowdfunding.   
The total amount of funding through ICOs in 2017 equalled $5.38 billion, surpassing 
early-stage venture capital investments in blockchain startups (Sunnarborg, 2017) and $12 
billion in the 16 months since January 2017 (Benedetti and Kostovetsky, 2018). Some 
blockchain startups have been able to raise capital via token sales at record speed, largely 
because of investors’ fear of missing out (also known as FOMO). For example, the company 
Gnosis was able to raise $12 million in less than 10 minutes (Cointelegraph, 2017). At the 
same time, the number of blockchain startups reaching their maximum fundraising goal has 
declined since the last quarter of 2017 and regulators are pointing out the risks associated 
with largely unregulated ICOs such as fraud, exaggeration of expected returns and lack of 
transparency (EY, 2017; SEC, 2017).  
In this paper, we aim to answer the question why some projects succeed in raising 
funding in ICOs and get their tokens listed on CoinmarketCap, a leading website for tracking 
exchange-traded cryptocurrencies, whereas others do not. In our analysis, we include both 
uncapped and capped ICOs. In an uncapped ICO the token supply is not limited or the token 
price is not known beforehand. This contrasts with capped ICOs in which the company sells a 
limited supply of tokens at a fixed priced. The vast majority of ICOs are capped. In a capped 
ICO the company may set two funding goals: a minimum fundraising goal (softcap) as well 
as a maximum fundraising goal (hardcap). The company only keeps the money it has raised 
in case the amount raised exceeds the pre-set softcap (“all-or-nothing”). Once the softcap has 
been reached the company keeps all the money it raises even if the hardcap has not been 
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reached (“keep–it-all”). In our analyses we use several dependent variables to measure 
funding success in order to reflect the different ways ICOs can be structured: a binary 
variable indicating whether the ICO reaches its softcap (if any), the amount of money raised 
as a percentage of the hardcap (only in capped ICOs), the log of the amount of money raised 
in the ICO, and a binary variable indicating whether the ICO is tracked on CoinmarketCap. 
In addition, we look beyond funding success and also investigate whether the project 
is successful afterwards or has ended up on what Varshneya (2018) calls the “digital 
graveyard”. We investigate whether the projects survive up to July 2018. We use four 
measures of ex-post success: whether the project has recently been active on Twitter, the 
number of Tweets per week since the ICO commenced, whether the project has recently 
updated its repositories on the software development platform GitHub and whether the 
project’s website is still online in July 2018. We employ a large sample of 630 capped and 
uncapped ICOs from August 2015 until December 2017. We stop in December 2017 in order 
to measure success as survival for a period of at least half a year. Our results show that ICOs 
with a higher transparency and expert rating are more successful in raising funds and perform 
better in the post-ICO period. We find evidence that having a pre-ICO GitHub repository, 
organising a presale for early investors, a shorter planned token sale duration, not having a 
bonus scheme, and having a larger project team is positively associated to fundraising 
success and depending on the measure used, also to ex-post project success. Moreover, the 
percentage of tokens retained by the project team is positively related to two of our measures 
of ex-post performance.   
Our paper adds to the literature on entrepreneurial finance and the emerging literature 
on ICOs. Existing studies on ICOs model the choice between ICO and venture capital 
funding (Catalini and Gans, 2018; Chod and Lyandres, 2018), investigate the need for 
legislation of ICOs (Kaal, 2018), the geography of ICOs (Huang, Meoli and Vismara, 2018), 
the liquidity and trading volume of exchange-traded ICOs (Howell, Niessner and Yermack, 
2018) and returns to investors in ICOs (Benedetti and Kostovetsky, 2018). We are aware of 
three other (working) papers on the determinants of funding success of ICOs. First, Adhami, 
Giudici and Martinazzi (2018) investigate 253 ICOs from 2014 until August 2017 of which 
81 percent reaches the softcap. They find that ICOs are more likely to reach the softcap in 
case their programming code is (partially) available in an online GitHub repository 
(measured after the ICO), when the company has presold tokens to early-stage investors and 
when tokens come with the right to access services or in some cases to a share in the profits. 
Second, Fisch (2018) examines 238 ICOs in 2016 and 2017. He finds that the dollar amount 
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raised in the ICO is positively impacted by a larger token supply, having a cryptocurrency 
token that is Ethereum-based, and the number of endorsements (stars) received on 
programming code repository GitHub (measured after the ICO). Third, Amsden and 
Schweizer (2018) look at the large sample of 1,009 ICOs (573 of which have data on funding 
amounts) from 2015 until March 2018 and use token tradability on CoinmarketCap as their 
main success measure. They report that venture uncertainty is negatively correlated with 
success while venture quality has a positive impact on ICO success.   
We extend the thin literature on ICOs fourfold. First, we investigate a number of 
previously unexplored determinants (most importantly, expert and transparency ratings, 
GitHub presence measured at the time of the ICO, and planned ICO duration in days). 
Second, we use various fundraising success measures that distinguish between capped versus 
uncapped ICOs and take into account the softcap and hardcap fundraising goals. Also, we use 
a funding success measure that captures whether the ICO is trading on an exchange 
recognized by CoinmarketCap, a tracking website for exchange-traded cryptocurrencies. 
Adhami et al. (2018) only look at whether the softcap has been reached and Fisch (2018) 
merely uses the log of the amount raised as the dependent variable. Amsden and Schweizer 
(2018) use token tradability as their key measure of success.  Third, we make use of the 
largest slice of the ICO universe for which data is available. We use eleven ICO databases1 to 
obtain this data, as no single database covers the full ICO universe. One issue that all ICO 
studies face is that many of the ICOs that end up being unsuccessful delete their data. These 
ICOs are thus less likely to be included in the analysis. However, we only miss out on a few 
unsuccessful ICOs. Our sample includes 630 out of the 682 ICOs listed on ICObench, a 
respected rating website for ICOs, during our sample period. This allows us to paint a more 
comprehensive picture of the determinants of fundraising success in ICOs compared to these 
previous studies. Fourth, we extend the existing papers on ICO funding success by adding an 
analysis of ex-post success of ICOs.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses ICOs in more 
detail. Section 3 derives our hypotheses. We describe our sample in Section 4. Section 5 
presents our results. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. A primer on ICOs 
                                                 
1 Databases accessed: www.tokendata.io, www.icotracker.net, www.cryptocompare.com/ico, 
www.smithandcrown.com/icos, https://elementus.io/token-sales-history, www.icomarketdata.com, www.icodata.io, 
www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker/, www.icobench.com/ico, www.coinschedule.com, www.ico-list.com, www.icostats.com 
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Cryptocurrencies are digital assets that can be used as a medium of exchange, using 
cryptography to secure and verify transactions. Tokens are a type of cryptocurrency 
representing an asset or utility, without creating a new blockchain or protocol. Instead, these 
tokens reside on top of another blockchain such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Tokens are used in 
most ICO campaigns and ICOs are therefore sometimes referred to as token sales. The first 
ever ICO was launched in 2013 when Mastercoin (currently called Omni), was able to raise 
over 5000 Bitcoins, at that time worth $500,000 (Jaffe, 2018). The crowdsale of Ethereum in 
2014 raised $18 million and has been very influential in shaping the present-day ICO 
landscape, as many applications are based on its blockchain. Ethereum created a new 
decentralised platform that incorporated smart contracts. Smart contracts are pre-written 
computer protocols that can be executed by the distributed ledger technology itself. It allows 
for entirely self-executing clauses from a contract, without any party verifying or performing 
the contract (Rosic, 2017). The most commonly used one for raising capital is ERC-20, a 
smart contract that creates a new cryptocurrency token and allows for transferring 
cryptocurrency from one person to another. This unique capability allows developers to build 
a wide variety of innovative applications on top of the Ethereum blockchain, becoming the 
most popular blockchain for ICOs (The Economist, 2017). 
In 2017, one of the first uncapped ICOs ran into trouble. Tezos raised $232 million in 
its uncapped ICO but soon after faced several class-action suits accusing the company of 
selling unregistered securities, misrepresenting on how funds would be spent, 
misrepresenting when the platform would go live, false advertising, and engaging in 
misleading trade practices. This triggered criticism regarding ‘uncapped sale’ models, a 
model that does not pre-specify the maximum about of funding raised during the ICO and in 
which entrepreneurs would only set a start and end-date, awaiting the number of coins that 
would be bought by investors. According to critics the uncapped model shows greed of the 
promoters trying to sell as many tokens as possible and provides a significant concern for 
investors as they expose themselves to high uncertainty about the cryptocurrency valuation 
(Buterin, 2017). Because of this, ICOs have more often become ‘capped’, predetermining the 
number of tokens for sale before ICO launch and setting a fixed price for the tokens. 
However, capped ICOs are more likely to be oversubscribed in case of strong investor 
interest, resulting in a more substantial incentive for investors to getting in first out of Fear of 
Missing Out (FOMO). Examples of successfully capped token sales are BAT and Gnosis, 
which were sold out 30 seconds and 10 minutes respectively (Buterin, 2017). 
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Since the inception of ICOs, regulators have expressed concerns about fraud, lack of 
transparency, and lack of investor protection. Unlike traditional shareholders, investors in 
ICOs often have no control over the project or its promotors (Kaal, 2018). However, at the 
time of writing only a few countries explicitly prohibit ICO campaigns. Most countries are 
using existing laws to regulate cryptocurrencies or assume a reactive stance by awaiting other 
countries’ actions before taking regulatory actions themselves. The chairman of the SEC, Jay 
Clayton, recently argued that some ICOs constitute the sale of securities and should, 
therefore, be registered with and regulated by the SEC (Marks, 2018). Several blockchain 
projects create a not-for-profit foundation in e.g., Switzerland or offshore corporations in, for 
example, the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar or Singapore to avoid taxation on the ICO proceeds. 
Huang, Meoli and Vismara (2018) examine the geography of ICOs and find that ICOs 
primarily come from countries with developed financial markets and advanced digital 
technologies. 
The ICO process starts with a pre-announcement on several relevant cryptocurrency 
forums (i.e. Reddit, Bitcointalk) and contains an executive summary of the projects’ 
objectives, team members and most notable features of the product. At this pre-ICO phase, 
tokens are sold privately to early bird investors who receive bonuses for investing during the 
presale. This allows the project developers to test market demand and estimate a price for the 
token. Comments made by early bird investors are considered when drafting the whitepaper, 
a document that contains more in-depth information about the project to support later 
investors in their decision-making process (Kaal and Dell’Erba, 2017; Yadav, 2017). 
Nowadays, more sophisticated blockchain ventures also publish a yellow paper, or a second 
whitepaper, that details the (in many cases tested and peer-reviewed) technology and 
innovations the venture has created or plans to create. However, companies that launch an 
ICO campaign face no mandatory disclosures. Whitepapers issued at the time of the ICO tend 
to be very technical and difficult to read for most investors and the content of the whitepaper 
has little if any impact on fundraising success (Fisch, 2018). Whitepapers are not audited or 
certified by any authority (Deloitte, 2017) and sometimes even lack the justification for using 
blockchain technology (EY, 2017). 
At the launch of the ICO, the project team announces the starting date of the public token 
sale. Typically, a marketing campaign is set up to address a broader group of potential 
investors (including smaller retail investors), playing a crucial role in the success of a 
campaign. Subsequently, the project team launches the public ICO and releases the 
cryptocurrencies. As there is no regulation concerning ICO structure, there are numerous 
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possibilities for project developers in the design of the campaign. For example, the project 
developers can opt for a capped versus uncapped sale, make use of minimum fundraising 
goals (softcaps) and/or maximum fundraising goals (hardcaps) and accept payment in fiat 
currency and/or (multiple) digital currencies (Buterin, 2017). The initial value and supply of 
the tokens are entirely at the discretion of the project developers, and often arbitrarily 
determined. Also, similar to the presale, some ventures reward early investors in the public 
ICO with free tokens or discounts.  
When an ICO is completed, the tokens will be available for trading usually two weeks 
after the end of the funding campaign. Benedetti and Kostovetsky (2018) find that tokens are 
on average underpriced by 179% from the ICO price to the opening price on the first trading 
day to compensate investors for the high risks associated with investing in ICOs. Currently, 
there are more than 40 exchanges, serving as secondary markets, available for cryptocurrency 
trading (Lea, 2017). Depending on the relation between the project developers and 
management of the cryptocurrency exchange, a newly issued token is listed. Often, project 
teams should pay a fee to register their cryptocurrency on an exchange – with higher costs for 
higher volumes. Howell et al. (2018) report that liquidity and trading volume of exchange-
traded tokens are higher when project developers disclose more information about the 
project, show a strong commitment to the project and signal quality.  
 
3. Hypotheses development 
 
Information asymmetry is one important barrier to the financing of early-stage ventures 
(Chod and Lyandres, 2018). At the time of the ICO, there are no compulsory or audited 
disclosures and the project is mostly at the idea stage with the actual launch of the product or 
service only expected within one to two years after the ICO (EY, 2017). Moreover, there is 
no or little regulation and investor protection. In theory, this context would impair successful 
fundraising by blockchain technology startups.  
The two typical asymmetric information problems of adverse selection (hidden 
information) and moral hazard (hidden action) plague the relationship between project 
developers and potential investors respectively before (“ex-ante”) and after (“ex-post”) the 
ICO. The first information problem of hidden information or adverse selection (Akerlof, 
1970) cannot be addressed by high-quality ICOs simply stating that they are of the high-
quality type. Also, a low-quality ICO could (falsely) claim to be of the high-quality type and 
therefore investors would ignore this “cheap talk”. Another possibility is to fully disclose 
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information directly to potential investors. Investors use several information sources to assess 
the quality of the token sale such as GitHub, Twitter, Telegram/Slack/Discord, Bitcoinwiki, 
Facebook, Bitcointalk, whitepapers, videos, and LinkedIn. We hypothesize that voluntary 
disclosure acts as a quality signal. Project teams of high-quality projects are more willing to 
disclose information whereas project teams of poor quality projects are less willing to share 
information with potential investors, especially when they face penalties if the disclosure 
proves to be fraudulent ex-post (e.g., see the theoretical model of Hughes, 1986). We 
hypothesize: 
   
Hypothesis 1A: More extensive disclosure (i.e., a higher transparency rating) has a positive 
influence on fundraising success 
Hypothesis 1B: More extensive disclosure (i.e., a higher transparency rating) has a positive 
influence on subsequent project success 
 
At the same time, projects might be hesitant to share technical proprietary information in 
whitepapers or in a public GitHub repository with a wider circle of investors. Moreover, at 
the time of the ICO, the product or service still needs to be developed and intellectual 
property rights by patents and/or trademarks are not (yet) in place. Also, the technical 
information in whitepapers seems difficult to comprehend by most investors in ICOs and 
most investors do not have the time and expertise to conduct a due diligence of the project 
themselves. One solution to this problem is to make use of ratings by experts. In the crypto-
sphere, a respected rating website, consisting of experts who voluntarily review ICOs, is 
ICObench. To become an expert one must show a thorough knowledge of cryptocurrencies 
and its underlying market dynamics. Reviewers obtain no compensation.2 We expect that 
highly rated ICOs are more likely to be successful in raising funds and in the period after the 
ICO. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 2A: Higher ratings by expert reviewers have a positive influence on fundraising 
success 
Hypothesis 2B: Higher ratings by expert reviewers have a positive influence on subsequent 
project success 
 
                                                 
2 https://medium.com/@ICObench/icobench-experts-the-importance-of-being-just-bbe07e00f73e 
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Another way to mitigate the adverse selection problem is signaling (Spence, 1973). In the 
case of signaling the project deliberately makes use of positive and observable indicators of 
otherwise not directly observable qualities in an attempt to mitigate the ex-ante information 
problem with investors (Spence, 2002). In order to be effective, a signal needs to be costly 
and correlate strongly with the quality it plans to indicate. High-quality ICOs are better able 
to absorb the higher costs of signaling. Low-quality projects will not imitate the signal of 
high-quality projects because they are not able or willing to bear the high costs associated 
with the signal. The benefits of being correctly identified as a high-quality ICO would 
outweigh the high costs only in case the project is truly of the high-quality type. The decision 
to post the programming code underlying the project on software development platform and 
repository GitHub can be seen as such a signal. It would allow experts to review the 
programming code and information about the technical side of the project before the ICO and 
collaborate on further improving it also in the period after the ICO. Only companies that are 
confident about the technical side of their project would subject it to expert scrutiny on 
GitHub before the ICO. We hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3A: Posting programming code or technical information on software repository 
GitHub before the ICO has a positive influence on fundraising success 
Hypothesis 3B: Posting programming code or technical information on software repository 
GitHub before the ICO has a positive impact on subsequent project success 
 
The distribution of tokens to insiders may be another important signal to investors. In ICOs, 
the percentage of tokens owned by the insiders after the ICO is known at the time of the ICO. 
These exchange-traded tokens can be sold in the future at a higher price in case the project is 
successful and needs to raise fresh capital. This signals that project developers are confident 
about the future success of the project and refrain from raising as much capital as possible 
from gullible investors at the time of the ICO. The percentage of tokens held by insiders may 
also mitigate the ex-post information or moral hazard problem. If insiders continue to own a 
significant percentage of the tokens they have a strong incentive to work hard towards a 
successful launch the blockchain project. 
 
Hypothesis 4A: A higher percentage of tokens retained by insiders positively impacts 
fundraising success 
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Hypothesis 4B: A higher percentage of tokens retained by insiders positively impacts 
subsequent project success 
 
An ICO can take place in multiple stages, i.e. a pre-ICO can be launched to test market 
demand and estimate a price for the token. Before opening the ICO to the public, early bird 
investors are typically able to obtain bonuses (e.g. deep discounts for early investors without 
lockups or vesting periods) to encourage early participation and to generate momentum. 
Typically there is a higher minimum investment amount compared to the public sale that 
follows afterwards. The ICO presale tends to be smaller than the public phase of the ICO and 
is intended to show to the public that the project team was able to have a pool of (befriended) 
cornerstone investors willing to invest in the project already.  
 
Hypothesis 5: ICOs preceded by a presale are more likely to successfully raise funds in the 
public phase of the ICO 
 
The public ICO follows suit, is open for everyone to invest in, and often has a lower 
minimum investment amount compared to the presale. Early investors in public token sales 
can also qualify for bonuses and price discounts albeit lower compared to the presale. This 
creates an incentive for investors to invest as soon as possible out of fear of missing out.  
However, having to make use of bonus schemes in the public phase of the ICO may also 
signal that the project team is struggling to attract sufficient interest in the presale (if 
organized) or in the ICO itself and that, despite the bullish market for ICOs in our sample 
period, it needs to resort to bonuses and price discounts to attract public investors. Moreover, 
potential investors may be afraid that too many bonus participants can engage in flipping and 
sell the tokens at a profit (at ICO price) once the tokens launch on a secondary market, 
driving the price down. We hypothesize that the use of bonus schemes in the public part of 
the ICO has a negative effect:  
 
Hypothesis 6: The use of bonus schemes in the public phase of the ICO negatively impacts 
fundraising success 
 
At the launch of the ICO, the project team announces the number of days the campaign will 
accept funding. In the context of reward-based crowdfunding, Mollick (2014) reports that 
campaigns with a longer duration have a lower probability of reaching their funding goals. 
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Planning on a longer duration may signal a lack of confidence in the project to potential 
investors (Mollick, 2014). We, therefore, hypothesize that a longer planned duration of the 
ICO campaign at the time of its launch negatively impacts fundraising success.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Longer planned campaign durations have a negative influence on fundraising 
success 
 
Investors may appreciate larger project teams, as it may show that a larger number of people 
are willing to work on bringing the project to fruition, speeding up the time to the actual 
launch of the blockchain project. Ahlers, Cumming, Gunther and Schweizer (2015) show that 
human capital (proxied by the number of board members) is positively related to funding 
success on one of the first crowdinvestment platforms, the Australian Small Scale Offerings 
Board. In addition, a larger project team implies a larger network of contacts it can mobilize 
to promote the ICO and assist in the project´s future development. We hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 8A: Having a larger project team positively impacts fundraising success 
Hypothesis 8B: Having a larger project team positively impacts subsequent project success 
 
4. Data and methods 
 
We start with an initial dataset consisting of 682 ICOs from ICObench and other sources 
during the period August 2015 until December 20173. We stop in December 2017 in order to 
measure success as survival for a period of at least half a year. Because information is widely 
dispersed on the internet and most databases often include only partial information, we 
identify these ICOs from eleven databases.4 Out of the available databases, ICObench 
provides the most thorough and highest quality information on ICO campaigns and therefore 
serves as the core of our sample. By using the Application Programming Interface (API), it is 
possible to draw information from the database directly. Even though we consider ICObench 
the most comprehensive database, it still lacks key information which we manually 
complemented with data from other databases, websites, forum threads and whitepapers.  
                                                 
3 See: https://icobench.com/stats 
4 Databases accessed: www.tokendata.io, www.icotracker.net, www.cryptocompare.com/ico, 
www.smithandcrown.com/icos, https://elementus.io/token-sales-history, www.icomarketdata.com, www.icodata.io, 
www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker/, www.icobench.com/ico, www.coinschedule.com, www.ico-list.com, www.icostats.com 
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For 52 out of 682 ICOs, it is not possible to find relevant information on the Internet, 
because websites, forum posts and Twitter accounts have been deleted or never took place. In 
case insufficient data is available online, we exclude the ICO from the dataset. In a handful of 
cases where we could not obtain the amounts of capital raised directly from ICObench or 
other sources, we have analysed the transactions on the blockchain during the ICO period to 
calculate the funding amount ourselves.5 This resulted in a sample consisting of 630 ICOs.   
 In our analyses we use four measures of funding success as our dependent variables, 
reflecting the different ways in which ICOs are structured. Table 1 shows the variable 
definitions. Table 2 provides an overview of the ICO distribution (country of origin, project 
category and blockchain used) in our sample. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. We 
measure funding success with a dummy variable indicating whether the softcap (i.e. the 
minimum funding goal) has been reached, the amount of capital raised as a percentage of the 
hardcap (i.e., the maximum funding goal), the log of the amount of capital raised, and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the ICO was admitted to trading on an online exchange 
that is tracked by CoinmarketCap. Table 3 shows that 185 ICOs make use of a softcap (29% 
of the sample). The softcap averages $4.96 million and 85 ICOs with softcaps (46% of the 
sample with softcaps) manage to raise more capital than the minimum target amount. Our 
sample contains 575 capped ICOs (91.3% of the sample) and 55 uncapped ICOs (8.7% of the 
sample). The average hardcap is set at $56.5 million for the capped ICOs. On average, a 
capped ICO raises 34% of its hardcap. The average amount of capital raised amounts to $9.55 
million with a minimum of zero and a maximum of $258 million. Cryptocurrencies more 
frequently accepted as payment are Ethereum (in 533 ICOs, 85% of the sample), followed by 
Bitcoin (in 184 ICOs, 29% of the sample). Fiat currency is only accepted in 41 ICOs (6.5% 
of the sample). In our sample 163 ICOs accept multiple currencies as means of payment for 
the tokens (26% of the sample). Half of the ICOs in our sample are admitted to trading on an 
online exchange tracked by CoinmarketCap.     
We also use four dependent variables to measure the success of the project 
afterwards. We look at whether the website of the project is still online in July 2018, the 
Tweets from the project team per week in the period between the start of the ICO and July 
2018, whether there have been any Tweets by the project team in the period May until July 
2018, and whether there any contributions on software repository GitHub during that same 
period. There are 518 project websites still online in July 2018 (82% of the sample). The 
                                                 
5 Using the following websites: www.etherscan.io, https://wavesexplorer.com, https://blockexplorer.com/ 
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average (median) Tweet activity of the project team equals 13.7 (7.06) Tweets per week 
during the period between the end of the ICO and July 2018. There are 387 projects with 
recent Tweets (70% of 552 projects with Twitter accounts), and 181 projects with recent 
activity on GitHub (about half of the 357 projects with GitHub repositories at any point in 
time).  
Our independent variables include the expert ratings and transparency ratings on 
rating website ICObench, a dummy variable indicating whether the project created a GitHub 
repository before the ICO (retrieved via a Chrome extension), the percentage of tokens 
retained by insiders, a dummy variable whether a presale takes place before the public phase 
of the ICO, a dummy variable indicating whether a bonus scheme is used in the public token 
sale, the planned duration of the ICO in days and the number of project team members. Table 
3 documents that the average (median) expert rating on ICObench equals 3.39 (3.47). The 
highest possible rating is five, corresponding to high-quality ICOs, whereas the lowest 
possible score is one, implying a weak investment opportunity. The rating consists of three 
elements: team, vision and product, and is available for 311 observations. The expert rating is 
based on the review of an average of 2.7 cryptocurrency experts. The transparency rating is 
available for all ICOs in the dataset and yields an average (median) of 3.03 (3). This rating is 
based on a computer algorithm and reflects the disclosure on ICObench for 31 distinct 
elements, such as the presence of GitHub, Twitter, Facebook etc. (for an extensive 
description consult Table 1). There are 253 projects with GitHub software repositories at the 
time of the ICO (40% of the sample). Insiders retain an average (median) of 42% (40%) of 
tokens. Presales happen in 241 cases (38.3% of the sample) and bonus schemes such as price 
discounts and free tokens are used in the public part of the ICO in 252 ICOs (40% of the 
sample). Table 3 shows that the average (median) duration of the ICO campaign is planned to 
be 29 days (30 days). The average (median) project team consists of 9.6 (8) members. 
We include several control variables in our regressions. In regressions using the 
funding percentage as the dependent variable, we control for the log of the hardcap (i.e., the 
maximum funding goal). Mollick (2014) reports that higher funding goals reduce the 
likelihood of funding success for reward-based crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter. In 
regressions using the log of the funding amount as the dependent variable, we control for a 
dummy that indicates whether the ICO was uncapped or not. In uncapped ICOs, the investors 
are uncertain about how many tokens will be sold or about the cryptocurrency valuation. This 
could signal opportunistic behaviour or even greed on the part of the project developers as 
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they sell as many tokens as investors want to buy (Buterin, 2017). In contrast, in capped ICOs 
the maximum amount of funding is fixed. There are 55 uncapped ICOs (8.7% of the sample). 
In addition, we control for the token price (excluding any bonuses and price 
discounts) and the log of the number of tokens created (i.e. the total of tokens that are sold 
and held by insiders). Investors might be more interested in tokens with lower prices and 
lower supply because they anticipate a more upward potential for these lower priced and 
scarce tokens. The average (median) token price equals $17.9 but the median token price 
equals only 26 dollar cents. The average (median) number of tokens created amounts to more 
than 20 billion (100 million). The large difference between average and median values 
indicates the presence of outliers. Therefore, we log transform the variables token price and 
token supply. Furthermore, we include the number of accepted currencies for payment, a 
dummy variable indicating if paying with fiat currency was possible and a dummy variable 
related to whether the project is (partly) based on the Ethereum platform as control variables 
in our models.  
In the next section, we report our regression results. In case of binary dependent 




5.1. Transparency and expert ratings  
 
In this section, we examine the effect of transparency and expert ratings on funding and ex-
post success measures. We start with a univariate analysis presented in Table 4. Panel A 
shows the funding and ex-post success measures split by the transparency rating categories 
(ranging from 0 to 5). Panel B displays these success measures split by expert rating 
categories (ranging from1 to 5). A clear pattern emerges showing that both higher 
transparency and expert ratings are associated with more funding as well as better ex-post 
project performance. Table 4 also shows the difference in means between ICOs with a 
transparency or expert rating above the median or below the median. Regarding funding 
success, ICOs with an above median transparency and expert rating are significantly more 
successful in reaching the softcap and raise more capital (both expressed as a percentage of 
the hardcap as well as the dollar amount) compared to ICOs with below median transparency 
or expert ratings. ICOs with an above median transparency and expert ratings are also more 
likely to have their tokens listed on CoinmarketCap than ICOs with a below median score on 
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these ratings. For ex-post success, Table 4 shows that ICOs with above median ratings 
perform superior compared to below median rated token sales. We find that ICOs with an 
above median transparency and expert rating have a significantly higher likelihood of their 
website being online in July 2018 and are more likely to have post-ICO Twitter and GitHub 
activity in the period between May and July 2018. The number of Tweets per week in the 
period from the start of the ICO until July 2018 is significantly higher for ICOs with above 
median transparency ratings compared to the ICOs with below median scores. However, we 
do not find a significant difference in the number of Tweets per week when comparing the 
ICOs with above and below median expert ratings even though the smaller categories with 
the lowest rating (up to 3) clearly have fewer Tweets. 
Next, we conduct multivariate regression analyses. Table 5 shows that the 
transparency and expert rating have a positive and highly significant impact on funding 
success, both when run separately (Panels A and B)  and jointly in a regression (Panel C) 
together with time dummies. The only exception relates to the expert rating which is no 
longer significantly associated with the probability of reaching the softcap target amount in 
Panel C of Table 5. However, it should be noted that the number of observations in the other 
models is much higher. The effects are both statistically and economically important: for 
example, in the second column of Table 5 we find that a one-point increase in the 
transparency or the expert rating will increase the funding percentage by more than ten 
percentage-points.   
Table 6 shows the effect of the transparency and expert ratings on ex-post success 
measures. We find that both types of ratings matter and have a positive and significant impact 
on how well the project performs in the post-ICO period. Only the expert rating loses its 
significance in the regression using Tweets per week as the dependent variable (Panel C), 
which is consistent with our univariate results.   
In line with our first two hypotheses, our results show that both transparency and 
expert ratings are statistically and economically important determinants of funding and ex-
post project success. These ratings serve as aggregated measures on the transparency and 
quality of ICOs and each is an important determinant in its own right. In the next subsection, 
we further delve into the underlying determinants of success. 
 
5.2. Success determinants  
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In this section, we investigate several determinants that, based on theory, we expect to impact 
funding and/or ex-post project performance (see Section 3). It is important to note that in our 
multivariate analyses we do not include the ratings. The reason is that many of the success 
determinants we look at are also components of the ratings (also see our variable description 
in Table 1). For example, the availability of a pre-ICO GitHub repository is also part of the 
transparency rating. None of the regressions in Tables 8 and 9 suffer from multicollinearity 
problems (Variance Inflation Factors are below two).  
As in the previous section, we start with a univariate analysis. Table 7 shows that, on 
average, a significantly higher fraction of ICOs reaches its softcap in case the project has one 
or more GitHub repositories at the time of the ICO, it has a below median duration, and an 
above median number of project team members. On average, an ICO raises a higher 
percentage of its hardcap, raises more money and is more likely to trade on an online 
exchange in case there is at least one pre-ICO GitHub repository, an above median retention 
of tokens by the project team, a below median planned duration of the campaign, and an 
above median number of people participating in the project team. ICOs with a bonus scheme 
in the public phase of the ICO experience less funding success on average. We find no 
statistical difference in average funding success between ICOs with and without a presale.  
Regarding the ex-post success measures, we find that, on average, a higher fraction of 
projects have their website online in July 2018 and generate more Tweets per week when 
they have one or more GitHub repositories at the launch of their ICO, the project team retains 
a percentage of tokens above the sample median and the project team has an above median 
number of team members. We report that fewer ICOs have their website online in July 2018 
in  case they offered bonuses to investors in the public phase of the token sale. A higher 
fraction of projects have recent Twitter and GitHub activity when they have above median 
token retention by insiders, they do not offer a bonus scheme, a planned duration of their 
campaign below the sample median, and their team consists of an above median number of 
members. On average, a higher fraction of projects has recent Twitter activity in case they 
have one or more GitHub repositories at the launch of their ICO.  
The multivariate results using the four funding success measures as the dependent 
variable are presented in Table 8. The first column shows that having a presale, a shorter 
planned duration and a higher number of team members positively impact the probability of 
hitting the softcap target amount. Funding as a percentage of the hardcap target amount, the 
amount of funding and the probability of getting the token traded on an online exchange are 
all positively impacted by having one or more GitHub repositories before the ICO, having a 
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presale but not having a bonus scheme in the public phase of the ICO, having a shorter 
planned duration of the campaign, and having more members on the project team. These 
findings are in line with our hypotheses 3A, 5, 6, 7 and 8A. However, in contrast with our 
hypothesis 4A insider token retention is insignificant. Considering the control variables, we 
observe that setting a higher target amount for the softcap reduces the probability of reaching 
that target and a setting a higher target amount for the hardcap negatively impacts funds 
raised as a percentage of that hardcap. These findings are in line with Mollick (2014) who 
finds similar results in the context of reward-based crowdfunding. In some model 
specifications, we also find the fiat currency dummy, the Ethereum dummy and the total 
token supply to be significant.  
The multivariate results using the four ex-post success measures are reported in Table 
9. The number of team members positively impacts all ex-post performance measures, 
consistent with hypothesis 8B. There is some support for Hypotheses 3B and 4B. Pre-ICO 
GitHub repositories are positively associated with the probability of having the project’s 
website online in July 2018 and the project team being active on Twitter in the period May 
until July 2018. Token retention by the project team is positively related to GitHub activity in 
the period May until July 2018 as well as the number of Tweets per week in the period from 
the ICO start until July 2018. 
Although we did not develop specific hypotheses concerning the ex-post performance 
for the other dependent variables, we do find that ICO campaigns that have been open for 
funding for a shorter period of time generate more Tweets in the period from the start of the 
ICO until July 2018 and are more likely to still be active on Twitter and GitHub in the period 
of May until July 2018. ICOs with a bonus scheme in the public phase of the selling process 
are associated with a lower probability of having the website online and Twitter activity in 
the period of May until July 2018. Several of the control variables (fiat currency dummy, 
token price and total token supply) are significant in some model specifications.  
We have also conducted several additional analyses (unreported). We have included 
dummies for the countries and categories listed in Table 2. Our results are robust to the 
inclusion of these dummies. Instead of time dummies, we controlled for investor sentiment 
by either the log of the number of ICOs in the month of the token sale or the volatility and 
return of Ethereum in the month preceding the month in which the ICO commenced. Our 
results are robust to controlling for these investor sentiment measures.  
 
6. Conclusions 
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Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) have become an increasingly popular way for entrepreneurs to 
raise money for early-stage blockchain projects. ICOs are fraught with asymmetric 
information problems between the project team vis-à-vis potential investors that are 
considering buying the tokens. This paper is the first to test whether ratings from rating 
websites such as ICObench can help to bridge this information gap. We find that projects that 
disclose more extensive information to investors (i.e. have a higher transparency rating) are 
more successful in fundraising and experience more post-ICO project success. In addition, a 
higher rating by cryptocurrency experts on the quality of the project and project team is 
associated with more success in fundraising and better ex-post performance.  
Our results further show that having one or more pre-ICO GitHub repository, a 
presale, not making use of bonus schemes in the public phase of the ICO, a shorter planned 
duration of the ICO campaign, and a larger project team are positively related to funding 
success. Depending on model specification, we also find that having at least one GitHub 
repository at the time of the ICO, the percentage of tokens retained by the project team, not 
having a bonus scheme in the public part of the ICO, a shorter planned period during which 
tokens are sold, and a larger number of project team members positively impact ex-post 
project performance.  
We conclude that for entrepreneurs it is important to make the ICO as transparent as 
possible and that, also for investors, expert ratings are a useful way in which to overcome the 
information asymmetry problems associated with token sales. Project teams that provide 
more and useful information to investors are more likely to successfully raise money from 
investors and perform superior afterwards. 
Our research demonstrates that in the ICO setting economic theory provides 
meaningful determinants of success, including disclosure and ratings that can reduce the 
information gap. However, we also demonstrate many elements that are specific to ICOs with 
strong effects on the success in raising funding and sustaining the business. Although our 
study presents tests of hypotheses and detailed information on the ICOs, future research will 
be needed to build theory specifically for ICOs, as well as empirical work assessing the 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition Data source 
Dependent variables:  
Funding success: 
  
Softcap hit (dummy) Dummy indicating one if the softcap is 
reached, zero otherwise  
ICObench* 
Funding percentage (%) Funding raised as percentage of hardcap ICObench* 
Funding raised ($ million) Funding raised in millions of US$ ICObench* 
Token tradability (dummy) Dummy indicating one if the ICO is traded on 
an online exchange tracked by CoinmarketCap, 
zero otherwise 
CoinmarketCap 
Ex-post success:   
Website online (dummy) Dummy indicating one if the project’s website 
is online in July 2018, zero otherwise 
Google 
Tweets per week (#) Number of Tweets per week measured during 
the period between the start of the ICO and 
July 2018 
Twitter 
Twitter activity  (dummy) Dummy indicating one if there are any Tweets 
from the project team in the period May until 
July 2018, zero otherwise 
Twitter 
GitHub activity (dummy) Dummy indicating one if there are any 
contributions to any of the project’s GitHub 
repositories  in the period May until July 2018, 
zero otherwise 
GitHub 
Independent variables   
Expert rating (from 1-5) The equally weighted average of ratings on 
product quality, vision quality and team quality 
by expert reviewers. Ranges from one to five. 
ICObench* 
Transparency rating (from 0-5) Transparency rating of the ICO, based on a 
computer algorithm and incorporating 31 
distinct elements. Ranges from zero to five. 
This rating includes whether the project:  
i. is covered on  GitHub, Twitter, 
Telegram/Slack/Discord, Reddit, 
Bitcoinwiki, Facebook and 
Bitcointalk ANN thread; 
ii. has an informative whitepaper 
and/or video available,  a 
minimum viable product or 
prototype is mentioned, and 
milestones are listed; 
iii. discloses the full names, LinkedIn 
profiles, photos of the project 
team, and/or; 
iv. discloses its ICO start date, ICO 
end date, token ticker, platform, 
accepted currencies, token price, 
bonus schemes, country of 
registration, and any hardcap or 
softcaps.   
ICObench* 
GitHub_preICO (dummy) Dummy indicating one if the project has one or 
more GitHub repositories at the time of the 
GitHub 
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ICO, zero otherwise 
Insider token retention (%) Percentage of tokens retained by the project 
team 
ICObench* 
Presale (dummy) Dummy indicating one if there is a presale of 
tokens to early bird investors, zero otherwise 
ICObench* 
Bonus scheme (dummy) Dummy indicating one if there is a bonus 
scheme (discounts and/or free tokens) in the 
public phase of the ICO, zero otherwise 
ICObench* 
Duration (# days) Number of planned for the ICO campaign at 
the time of its launch 
ICObench* 
Team members (#) Number of members of the project team ICObench* 
Control variables   
Softcap ($ million) Softcap target amount in millions of US dollars ICObench* 
Hardcap ($ million) Hardcap target amount in millions of US 
dollars 
ICObench* 
Uncapped ICO (dummy) Dummy indicating one if the ICO is uncapped, 
zero otherwise 
ICObench* 
Accepted currencies (#) Number of accepted cryptocurrencies that are 
accepted as payment for the tokens 
ICObench* 
Fiat currency (dummy) Dummy indicating  one if a fiat currency (e.g. 
US dollars) can be used as payment for the 
tokens, zero otherwise 
ICObench* 
Ethereum platform (dummy) Dummy indicating one if the project is (partly) 
based on the Ethereum blockchain, zero 
otherwise 
ICObench* 
Token price ($ cents) Token price in US dollar cents ICObench* 
Total tokens (in millions) Total number of tokens after ICO in millions 
(circulating and retained) 
ICObench* 
Note: * In case data was missing on ICObench, it is complemented by using information from 
additional sources such as: www.tokendata.io, www.icotracker.net, www.cryptocompare.com/ico, 
www.smithandcrown.com/icos, https://elementus.io/token-sales-history, www.icomarketdata.com, 
www.icodata.io, www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker/, www.icobench.com/ico, www.coinschedule.com, 
www.ico-list.com, www.icostats.com. Additionally, we consulted the whitepaper, website, 
Bitcointalk forum thread, Telegram, Twitter and Facebook of the ICO to complement missing data.  
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Table 2: Sample distribution 
 
Country Category Blockchain 
  Count %   Count %   Count % 
USA 121 19.2 Platform 166 26.3 Ethereum 533 84.6 
Russia 85 13.5 Currency 100 15.8 Waves 39 6.2 
UK 47 7.4 
Business 
services 
66 10.5 BitShares 5 0.8 
Singapore 42 6.7 Entertainment 45 7.1 NEO 4 0.6 
Switzerland 27 4.3 Investment 31 4.9 NEM 3 0.5 
Canada 17 2.7 Software 31 4.9 Omni 3 0.5 
Estonia 14 2.2 Banking 28 4.4 Counterparty 2 0.3 
Australia 13 2.1 
Casino & 
gambling 
18 2.9 Litecoin 2 0.3 
Germany 11 1.7 Internet 15 2.4 NXT 2 0.3 
Hong Kong 11 1.7 Real estate 15 2.4 Ardor 1 0.2 
Israel 11 1.7 Other 14 2.2 Electroneum 1 0.2 
Netherlands 11 1.7 Media 11 1.7 Expanse 1 0.2 




China 8 1.3 Tourism 9 1.4 Maidsafe 1 0.2 
Lithuania 8 1.3 Infrastructure 8 1.3 NEBL 1 0.2 
France 7 1.1 Sports 8 1.3 Own 1 0.2 
Japan 7 1.1 Communication 7 1.1 QRC 1 0.2 
Spain 7 1.1 Education 7 1.1 Tendermint 1 0.2 
Unknown 60 9.5 Retail 7 1.1 Unknown 26 4.1 
Other 112 17.9 Other 35 5.7 Other 2 0.3 
Total 630   Total 630   Total 630   
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables:  
Funding success 
      
Softcap hit (dummy) 185 0.46 0 0.5 0 1 
Funding percentage (%) 575 34.24 14.14 39 0 100 
Funding raised ($ million) 630 9.55 1.98 23.8 0 258 
Token tradability (dummy) 630 0.5 1 0.5 0 1 
Dependent variables:  
Ex-post success: 
      
Website online (dummy) 630 0.82 1 0.38 0 1 
Tweets per week (#) 552 13.7 7.06 23.67 0 210 
Twitter activity  (dummy) 552 0.7 1 0.46 0 1 
GitHub activity (dummy) 357 0.5 1 0.5 0 1 
Independent variables:       
Quality rating (from 1-5) 311 3.39 3.47 0.93 1 5 
Transparency rating (from 0-5) 630 3.03 3 1.03 0.6 5 
GitHub_preICO (dummy) 630 0.40 0 0.49 0 1 
Insider token retention (%) 630 41.51 40 25.01 0 99 
Presale (dummy) 630 0.38 0 0.49 0 1 
Bonus scheme (dummy) 630 0.4 0 0.49 0 1 
Duration (# days) 630 28.96 30 17.77 1 134 
Team members (#) 630 9.58 8 7.54 1 57 
Control variables:       
Softcap ($ million) 185 4.96 2 7.93 0.3 51 
Hardcap ($ million) 575 56.53 20 347 0.02 7801 
Uncapped ICO (dummy) 630 0.08 0 0.283 0 1 
Accepted currencies (#) 630 1.59 1 1.36 1 13 
Fiat currency (dummy) 630 0.07 0 0.25 0 1 
Ethereum platform (dummy) 630 0.85 1 0.36 0 1 
Token price ($ cents) 630 1,788.59 25.91 30,480.48 0.01 755,460 
Total tokens (in millions) 630 20,229 100 337,554 0.01 8,000,000 







 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250035 
 25 
Table 4: Univariate tests: Transparency and expert ratings  
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Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. Table reports averages. Number of observations is in 
parentheses. The last column shows a t-statistic for the test for difference in means. *=significant at 
the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 5: Determinants of funding success: Transparency and expert ratings 
 








Panel A     








Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 185 575 630 630 
F-Value  36.03*** 57.41***  
Wald Chi2 43.72***   133.19*** 
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.274 0.182 0.313 0.214 
Panel B     








Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 97 290 311 311 
F-Value  22.62*** 17.95***  
Wald Chi2 9.03   62.79*** 
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.091 0.215 0.225 0.178 
Panel C     
















Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 97 290 311 311 
F-Value  34.97*** 33.53***  
Wald Chi2 25.73***   73.81*** 
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.325 0.287 0.441 0.284 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The first and fourth column report average marginal effects 
from logistic regressions with z-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. The second and 
third column report OLS regression coefficients with t-statistics using robust standard errors in 
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Panel A     








Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 630 552 552 357 
F-Value  14.00***   
Wald Chi2 69.53***  97.64*** 24.73*** 
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.140 0.058 0.221 0.056 
Panel B     








Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 311 289 289 195 
F-Value  2.22*   
Wald Chi2 25.05***  50.93*** 20.54*** 
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.091 0.012 0.239 0.088 
Panel C     
















Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 311 289 289 195 
F-Value  9.28***   
Wald Chi2 47.80***  57.18*** 26.13*** 
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.220 0.050 0.354 0.117 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The first, third, and fourth column report average marginal 
effects from logistic regressions with z-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
second column reports OLS regression coefficients with t-statistics using robust standard errors in 
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Table 7: Univariate tests 
  
 
PreICO_GitHub  Insider token 
retention 
 Presale  
Funding success 
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Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. Table reports averages. Number of observations is in parentheses. The last column shows a t-statistic for the test for 
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Table 8: Determinants of funding success 
 








Independent variables     
















































Control variables     
Softcap (log) -0.085  
(-5.07)***  
  
Hardcap (log)  -0.083  
(-5.27)*** 
  














































Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 185 575 630 630 
F-Value  17.68*** 13.53***  
Wald Chi2 44.28***   152.62*** 
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.233 0.264 0.229 0.228 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The first and fourth column report average marginal effects 
from logistic regressions with z-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. The second and 
third column report OLS regression coefficients with t-statistics using robust standard errors in 
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Independent variables     
















































Control variables     
















































Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 630 552 552 357 
F-Value  3.11***   
Wald Chi2 64.08***  76.71*** 42.32*** 
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.125 0.081 0.174 0.094 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The first, third, and fourth column report average marginal 
effects from logistic regressions with z-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
second column reports OLS regression coefficients with t-statistics using robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% 
level.  
 
 
 
 
